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HERE AND EVERYWHERE: 
Sociology of  Scientific Knowledge 
Steven Shapin 
Department of Sociology and Science Studies Program, University of California, 
San Diego, La Jolla, California 92093-0102 
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The sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) is one of the profession's  most 
marginal specialties, yet its objects of inquiry, its modes of inquiry, and certain 
of its findings have very substantial bearing upon the nature and scope of tihe 
sociological enterprise in general. While traditional sociology of knowledge 
asked how, and to what extent, "social factors" might influence the products 
of  the mind, SSK sought to show that knowledge was constitutively social, 
and in so doing, it raised fundamental questions about taken-for-granted divi- 
sions between "social versus cognitive, or natural, factors." This piece traces 
the historical development of  the sociology of scientific knowledge and its 
relations with sociology and cultural inquiry as a whole. It identifies dominant 
"localist" sensibilities in SSK and the consequent problem it now confronts of 
how scientific knowledge travels. Finally, it describes several strands of crit- 
icism of SSK that have emerged from among its own practitioners, noting the 
ways in  which  some criticisms can be seen as a revival of  old aspirations 
toward privileged meta-languages. 
There is no shortage of reviews and assessments of the sociology of scientific 
knowledge (SSK). Most have been written by critics or by participants meaning 
to put their special stamp on a contentious and splintered field.'  I too am a 
participant: My views about what the field is, and ought to be, are strongly held; 
they have been canvassed elsewhere, and they will be unavoidably evident in this 
survey. Yet my purpose here is less to score points than to offer a critical survey 
'special note should be taken of Lynch (1993:Ch 2-4),  which, while it argues a vigorous case 
for the virtues of ethnomethodology, is a detailed critical survey of recent trends in the social studies 
of science. 290  SHAPIN 
ofhow SSKdeveloped, and continues to develop, in relation to sociology, and to 
make the leading concerns of the field rather more comprehensible to sociolo- 
gists in general than they have been. For this specialty, such a purpose is not 
banal, as neither the place of SSK in the sociological culture nor its implications 
for the future of sociology+specially  social theory-have  been adequately 
canvassed bef~re.~  The "here and everywhere" of my title refers at once to the 
problematic place of SSK within academic sociology and to a central problem it 
has generated and now confronts-how  to interpret the relationship between the 
local settings in which scientific knowledge is produced and the unique effi- 
ciency with which such knowledge seems to travel. 
Sociology of ScientiJic Knowledge and the Academic Culture 
SSK must count as one of sociology's notable recent successes. Emerging not 
more than  25 years  ago,  in  the  1970s and  early  1980s it  was  an  almost 
exclusively British practice (Collins 1983a:26&71). Now there are influential 
practitioners throughout North America, as well as in France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Scandinavia, Israel, and Australia; and key  Anglophone works 
have been translated into French, Italian, Japanese, Polish, Russian, and Span- 
ish. Programs in  "Science Studies," "Science and  Technology Studies," or 
"Science, Technology and Societyv-several  elaborately funded by  the US 
National Science Foundation-employing  sociologists of scientific knowledge 
have sprung up at leading American universities; relevant professional socie- 
ties flourish. Journals and academic publishers, once unaware of  or uninter- 
ested in the field, now actively seek out contributions, creating a situation in 
which demand outstrips quality supply. Seminal monographs have been re- 
printed and advertised as "classics"  (Bloor 1991, Collins 1992); anthologies, 
primers, synthetic surveys, and candidate textbooks have appeared and been 
superseded by new texts bidding to redefine a fast-changing field (Barnes 1972, 
1985, Mulkay  1979, Barnes & Shapin 1979, Barnes & Edge  1982, Law & 
Lodge 1984, Yearley 1984, Woolgar 1988a, Cozzens & Gieryn 1990, Callon 
& Latour 1991, Jasanoff et a1  1994). 
Projects have been launched to intercalate the findings of SSK into programs 
of science communication and liberal education (Collins & Pinch 1993, Cham- 
bers & Turnbull 1989)3  and into the analysis and formulation of science and 
*ASI shall note below, many sociologists of scientific knowledge were not professionally trained 
in sociology, and neither was I. (My training and much of my work belong more to history than to 
sociology.)  Such  amateurism  often  betrays  itself  in  naivetC,  far  less  often  in  insight  into 
fundamentals.  Not  coming  to  sociology  through  a  normal  career-route,  I  find  myself 
"unprofessionally"  interested in what it is to have a sociological understanding of science. 
'A  measure  of  the  provisional  success of  these suggestions is a recent  series on  scientific 
experiment, published in The Economist (Morton & Cam 1993). which draws heavily upon SSK 
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technology policy (Jasanoff 1990,1992, Wynne 1992,  Collins 1985,  Fuller 1993, 
Cambrosio et a1 1990,  Travis & Collins 1991, Epstein 1993), while the potential 
of  SSK (broadly construed) to recast the traditional categories of social and 
cultural theory as a whole has been asserted (Latour 1993, Law 1994).4 
Most importantly, the general academic culture has shown great interest in 
what has been done in this field. Unlike many other sociological specialties, 
SSK has strongly engaged the attention of historians and philosophers (e.g. 
Shapin 1982, Shapin & Schaffer 1985, Rudwick 1985, Golinski 1990, Dear 
1995, Fuller 1988, 1992, Rouse 1987, Toulmin 1990). and the boundary lines 
between what counts as historical or philosophical and what as sociological 
practice in the area have been blurred to the point of in~isibility.~  Meanwhile 
anthropologists, literary and feminist theoreticians, and a loosely defined but 
trendy "cultural studies" community have been attracted in significant numbers 
to the study of science largely through work in SSK. The social study of science 
is one of the modem academy's most unremittingly interdisciplinary projects. 
Twenty-five years ago it was a truth almost universally acknowledged that 
there might be a legitimate sociological understanding of  scientific error, of 
"the blind alleys entered by science," of the state of scientific institutionaliza- 
tion, and, perhaps, of the overall dynamics of  scientific foci, but that there 
could be no such thing as a sociology of  authentically scientific knowledge 
(Ben-David 1971:  11-13). Now, while assent to the validity of SSK is scarcely 
universal, a number of central claims have quietly passed into common aca- 
demic currency, and the recent paths of the history and philosophy of science, 
technology, and medicine have been fundamentally shaped by practitioners' 
appreciation of opportunities opened up or problems posed by SSK research. 
At the same time, the field shows many signs of being in serious trouble: 
Some problems are of  very long standing, while others must be seen as the 
bitter fruits of success itself. The very achievement of SSK in establishing the 
possibility, legitimacy, and interest of a thoroughly sociological (and social 
historical) understanding of scientific knowledge has attracted so great a range 
of scholars from other disciplines that neither the boundaries of the field nor 
4~ecent social theorists continue to comment centrally on modern science and technology while 
engaging only obliquely or not at all with the SSK literature (e.g. Bauman 1993:199-209, Giddens 
1993:9-15,  Bourdieu 1990,1991). 
'when  the speciality was last reviewed in this journal, HM Collins (1983a:272) acutely noted 
that the relationship between SSK and relevant history was seamless and that a "proper description" 
of the field "would treat the history of science as integral." Yet, largely restricting his treatment to 
ethnographic studies of contemporary science, Collins did not there attempt to offer such a "proper" 
account. Two years earlier (Collins 1981a). he had voiced doubts that historical work was capable 
in principle of attaining the ethnographer's understanding of science, and four years later (1987) he 
proclaimed that historical studies represented some of the best SSK. Shifting  judgments are possibly 
best read as reliable reflections of shifting realities. 292  SHAPIN 
its intellectual goals and foci are any longer at all clear. What appears to some 
practitioners as an admirable "diversity of voices" seems to others lamentable 
incoherence and lack of seriousness of purpose. The "social study of science," 
as opposed to SSK "proper," has developed into one of the modem academy's 
most centrifugal, most argumentative (at times uncivil), as well as most vital 
terrains (e.g. Pickering 1992). Just because what is at stake is nothing less than 
the proper interpretation of our culture's most highly valued form of knowl- 
edge-its  truth-the  struggle for interpretative rights has become fraught and 
bitter. Names are called and mud is slung. The weight of the world's injustices 
is dumped firmly on the shoulders of those maintaining "incorrect" method- 
ological views. This is not a practice for the cardiovascularly challenged. 
Fundamental issues of methodological propriety are fervently debated. Choices 
between Durkheimian objectivism and Weberian subjectivism, explanatory and 
interpretative  goals, stress on structure  and agency,  micro and macro foci, theoretical 
and empirical methods-all  are often fought out in relative disengagement from the 
career of  parallel  debates in  mainstream  sociology, with  results  ranging from 
rediscovered wheels to important respecifications of the terms of debate (Callon & 
Latour 198  1, Collins 198  la, 1983b,  Knorr-Cetina 1981a,b,  Law 1974,1984,  Tumer 
1981). Metaphysical and ontological schemes are proffered, and it is asserted that 
sociology of  science requires the adoption of the correct scheme, while skeptics 
wonder why interpretative projects should be supposed to require a metaphysics 
(Latour 1993, Shapin 1992:354-60). Leading sociologists of science discover that 
the practice has contained social-theoretical entities, such as "interests,"  and an- 
nounce their gleeful despair that "definitive" descriptions or explanations of science 
canever be attained,  while other practitioners  express  bemusement  that anyone could 
ever think to construct accounts free of theorizing or pretending to definitiveness 
(Woolgar 1981, Barnes 1981). 
Relativism is attacked (far less often than it is actually commended) as an 
insidious threat to the fabric of social order, while advocates argue that meth- 
odological (not moral or ontological) relativism is simply necessary for the 
naturalistic interpretation of variation in belief.6 Practitioners agonize over the 
proper posture of  the analyst, as between disinterested and committed. The 
original claim that SSK was just the extension of science to the study of itself 
(Bloor [I9761 1991) has been countered by the increasingly insistent-though 
perhaps not yet dominant-voices  of writers meaning to "expose" science (as 
6~or an analyst to say that the credibility  of two different beliefs about the world should be 
interpreted using the same ntethods is, thus, not necessarily the same thing as saying that they are 
equally "true"  or that the world(s) to which they refer is(are) multiple. Almost all SSK relativists 
set aside ontological questions and treat tnlth-judgments as topic rather than as resource. So far as 
morality is concerned, the dominant tendency here is not to celebrate moral anarchy but to interpret 
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"hegemonic,"  as "masculinist," as "dehumanizing," as "mystifying")  and by 
those who reckon that  a proper task  for scholars is to open up  alternative 
visions of  what  science might be  and how  its social relations ought to be 
constituted (Martin 1993, Restivo 1989, Lynch & Fuhrman 1991, Scott et a1 
1990; cf Collins 1991, Lynch 1992b). 
Quite recently, small numbers of  eminent natural scientists have become 
aware of SSK, and, cavalierly neglecting crucial differences in tone and intent 
among practitioners, have sought to expose them all as motivated by hostility to 
science, purportedly animated by hidden political agendas (Gross &Levitt 1994, 
Wolpert 1992). Alleged crises in public confidence in, and support for, science 
have been traced-incredible  as it may seem-to  the sinister influence of SSK 
and fellow-traveling philosophy of  science (e.g. Theocharis & Psimipoulis 
1987).  The political vulnerability of one of the few sociological specialties that, 
so to speak, "studies up," that aims to interpret a culture far more powerful and 
prestigious than itself, and that offers accounts at variance with that culture's 
official myths, is only now being made manifest. As the Chinese proverb has it, 
he who rides on the back of the tiger may wind up inside. 
The number of sociologists working in the area continues to be very small. 
The rise of SSK to relative popularity coincided with the Thatcher govern- 
ment's systematic reduction in British university funding, from which several 
of the original homes of  this sort of  work suffered significantly, eroding or 
eliminating their ability to train the next generation. A surge of interest in this 
area among American institutions from the mid-1980s was also checked by 
recession  and  a consequent  retrenchment  in  graduate  student  support  and 
opportunity. Hard times discourage intellectual adventurousness, on the part 
of both students and recruitment committees. Time and improving economies 
may heal these wounds, but endemic structural difficulties beset SSK. 
First, the sociological study of science makes demands upon initiates which 
all but a handful find difficult to fulfill. Despite the continuing scientistic bent 
of  North  American  sociology, few  students come  equipped  with  relevant 
competences in the natural sciences. The genuine incapacity of many to get 
to grips with the scientific technicalities involved is added to the fear of others 
that such competences will be extremely hard to acquire. Despite much liberal 
educational rhetoric and distribution requirements, the gap between the "Two 
Cultures" described by  CP Snow in  1959 has not noticeably been bridged. 
There is a widespread, and partly justified,  sense that SSK is "hard,"  and 
students searching for a secure career-track are encouraged to look el~ewhere.~ 
'Yet  it has to be noted that the study of any culture possessing esoteric knowledge--e.g.  that of 
machinists,  soldiers, nurses,  or  Azande  magicians-demands  similar dedication  and  similar 
commitment to technical mastery. It is arguably not the "difficulty" of science but its "prestige" and 
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Nor does the poor availability of undergraduate courses in the area do much 
either to inform students about what the specialty is like or to give them even 
a smattering of familiarity to set against structurally induced "technophobia." 
Moreover, scientistic North American sociological traditions and, to a lesser 
extent, traditions in  Britain and Europe continue actively to disseminate a 
picture of scientific "method and scientific knowledge radically at variance 
with those offered by SSK. There is an argument that the last great bastion of 
faith in simplistic images of science and its "method is not to be found in the 
natural but in the social sciences. 
Students thus trained often find the body of  recent SSK-when  they en- 
counter it-not  just unfamiliar but shocking. Few sociology texts prepare them 
for the claim that scientific truth is amenable to a thoroughgoing sociological 
scrutiny, while some of the most senior and eminent authorities remain among 
the  unconvinced or unapproving. Joseph  Ben-David (1981:41-47,  54-55), 
judging work in the area to be largely "programmatic," pronounced SSK to 
be "sociologically irrelevant" and a "failure."  Stephen Cole (1992: 81), while 
making irenic gestures toward SSK, nevertheless gave his opinion that it had 
"failed  to generate a single example or case study"  that shows that social 
processes "actually influence the specific cognitive content of science." And 
TS Kuhn (1992:8-9), dissociating himself from sociological appropriation of 
his work, has recently proclaimed that SSK, or, more ambiguously, what "has 
been widely understood" as its claims, is "an  example of deconstruction gone 
mad."8 Compared to other specialties, SSK has few senior advocates or prac- 
titioners in the sociological profession, nor, despite its persistent characteriza- 
tion as "fashionable," is association with SSK evidently a sound strategy of 
career advancement. 
SSK and Sociology 
The founding father of  the sociology of  science, Robert K Merton, worked 
from the late 1930s through the 1960s to constitute the study of science as a 
legitimate branch of structural-functionalist sociology, while at the same time 
he attempted to constitute sociology as "scientific." What counted as "being 
*~amet Zuckerman's recent full-scale survey (1988) of the sociology of science is, by com- 
parison, notably informed about and courteous toward strands of SSK, while she labors to assimilate 
this work to the structural-functional tradition with which it is often seen to be in conflict. I should 
add that, as a participant, I am, of course, wholly satisfied that a sociology of scientific knowledge 
is both possible and necessary, and that it has accumulated a large body of outstanding empirical 
work. Likewise, I am satisfied that much-not  all-criticism of SSK continues to proceed from an 
obtuse-and  possibly  willful-misrepresentation  of  its central methods and claims (cf Barnes 
1994:22-25, Bloor 1991:163-85).  Yet my purpose here is not merely to reiterate old arguments in 
defense  of  SSK but  to try to note some features of  the cultural framework in which  that mis- 
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scientific" was overwhelmingly taken from formal and informal philosophical 
models of the natural scientific "method" (e.g. Parsons 1949:Ch 1). The same 
sensibility that persuaded Merton and his associates that sociological account- 
ing had to stop at the door of scientific method and scientific knowledge (e.g. 
Merton 1970:xviii-xix,  75, 199-200)  also supported the claims of sociology 
to be a genuine science. Accordingly, the very idea of a sociology of scientific 
knowledge butted against the self-understanding and legitimation of dominant 
strands of sociology. It is this circumstance, more than others, that makes the 
place of SSK so problematic within the overall sociological culture, especially 
in its North American form. 
Therefore, Peter Winch's (1958) critique of enterprises that tried to base an 
understanding of social action on the methods of natural science was decisive 
for several practitioners of SSK (Collins 1975:216, 1981a:373, Knorr-Cetina 
1981a:148-49, Lynch 1993:40-41, 163, 183, 228). If social science could be 
construed as fundamentally different from natural science-in  its objects and 
in its appropriate methods-then  it followed that the opening up of the natural 
sciences to sociological understanding need not be seen as a threat to sociology. 
The pertinence of Winch's views indicates the importance to SSK of intellec- 
tual resources coming from the margins of the American sociological profes- 
sion,  and,  indeed,  from  outside  of  sociology  proper.  !9  Winch'&ookig- 
nificantly  stimulated curiosity  about  the  later  philosophy  of  Wittgenstein, 
especially its analysis of  the indeterminacy of  "rules,"  while other British 
practitioners disputed Winch's distinction between sociology and natural sci- 
ence (Bloor 1983). The intellectual mix that in the  1970s inspired the early 
sociological studies of such British writers as Barry Barnes, David Bloor, HM 
Collins, Donald MacKenzie, Michael Mulkay, Richard Whitley, and Steve 
Woolgar included, to be  sure, elements of the classic sociological theory of 
Durkheim and, more diffusely, of  Marx, but also the historiography of TS 
Kuhn, the comparative cultural anthropology of  EE Evans-Pritchard, Mary 
Douglas, and Robin Horton, philosophical work on the categories of sociolog- 
ical explanation by Alisdair MacIntyre, Basil Bemstein's revisionist sociology 
of language and education, the relativist philosophy of Nelson Goodman, Mary 
Hesse's neo-Bayesian philosophy of  science, and, especially, a vast body of 
detailed historical work  on the natural sciences in  their social and cultural 
contexts. 
In the early and mid  1980s, SSK received an infusion from practitioners 
trained in, or attracted by, phenomenological and ethnomethodological tradi- 
tions. Studies by  Michael Lynch, Steve Woolgar, Steve Yearley, and  Eric 
Livingston drew significantly on work by Alfred Schutz and Harold Garfinkel 
%inch's  work, while influential in British sociological theorizing, is referred to little or not at 
all in standard American surveys. 296  SHAPIN 
(Lynch 1988, 1993:Ch 4). [It was predominantly these writers who imported 
the tag "social construction" into SSK, most immediately by  way of Berger 
& Luckmann (1966), though others not primarily indebted to phenomenology 
soon elaborated a modified conception of "social constructionism," different 
from both its theoretical begetters and from sociological "labeling theory."]10 
More recently,  such sociologists as Susan Leigh  Star, Adele Clarke, Joan 
Fujimura, and Chandra Mukerji have effected links between SSK and "Chicago 
School" interactionist sociology of work, occupations, and culture (e.g. Clarke 
1990, Clarke & Montini  1993, Star 1989, Star & Griesemer  1989, Mukerji 
1989, Fujimura  1987, 1988). And  all through the  1980s, social studies of 
science have been increasingly preoccupied by  challenges to several central 
descriptive and explanatory categories emerging from a Parisian circle centered 
on Bruno Latour, whose work was itself fundamentally shaped by Nietzschean 
and Heideggerian philosophical traditions as well  as by  the techniques  of 
semiotics and anthropological ethnography (Latour 1987, 1988a, 1993). 
Only in one respect is SSK typical of the sociological profession: Its prac- 
titioners disagree about the very  identity of  sociology, and, therefore, about 
the  identity  of  a legitimate  sociological framework for  the  study of  their 
objects. In the late  1970s and early  1980s, Ben-David, meaning to be rude 
about SSK, observed (1978:203-08,  1981:43-47; cf  Zuckerman  1988:513) 
that few of its leading practitioners were properly trained as sociologists, that 
they meddled with epistemological concerns best left to philosophers, and that, 
owing to their amateurism, they were unfamiliar with the history of  disaster 
that was said to be the career of systematic sociological attempts to account 
for scientific knowledge. Ben-David's description was, to be sure, correct on 
several points. Few  of  the founding figures were professionally trained as 
sociologists (Collins 1983a:267-68). On the other hand, a number had natural 
science backgrounds  that  discouraged  them  from confusing  the  reality  of 
scientific knowledge-making with textbook idealizations. The field was also 
particularly receptive to the sociological exploitation of historical and philo- 
sophical frameworks developed by such writers as Michael Polanyi (1958) and 
Thomas Kuhn (1962), who did have extensive natural scientific experience. 
Moreover, as Ben-David rightly noted, the leading concerns of  "British" 
SSK were philosophical and, in particular, epistemological. If scientific judg- 
ment and the growth of  knowledge could be  adequately accounted for by 
impersonal  canons  of  evidence, logic,  rationality,  and,  especially,  of  "the 
'OB~ theearly to mid 1970s,phenomenologically inclined sociologists were widely appropriating 
the tag, and it remains especially fashionable in work on sexuality, deviance, and crime. So far as I 
can discover, the first uses of the term in titles of studies concerned with science appear in 1976 and 
1977: evidently the term reached its height of SSK popularity in the late 1970s andearly 1980s (e.g. 
Latour & Woolgar 1979. MacKenzie 1981a. and Collins & Pinch 1982). SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE  297 
scientific method,"  then, indeed, neither a sociological nor  an  historically 
contextual account was appropriate for the interpretation or explanation of 
scientific knowledge. The "Great Tradition" of Vienna Circle logical empiri- 
cism was  concerned with providing not a naturalistic account of  scientific 
change and judgment but (as Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach said) its 
"rational reconstruction." Yet other philosophers wrote as if "method-stories" 
were historically adequate, and still others continued to conceive of sociolog- 
ical considerations as potential "pollutants" of authentic science, to be guarded 
against or relegated to the contingent domain of "contexts of discovery." 
Accordingly, early SSK took it as a primary task to create a legitimate space 
for sociology where none had previously been permitted, in the interpretation 
or explanation of  scientific knowledge. In just  that sense,  SSK set  out  to 
construct an "anti-epistemology," to break down the legitimacy of the distinc- 
tion  between  "contexts  of  discovery and justification,"  and  to  develop  an 
anti-individualistic and anti-empiricist framework for the sociology of knowl- 
edge in which "social factors" counted not as contaminants but as constitutive 
of the very idea of scientific knowledge (e.g. Bloor 1975, Law 1975; cf Fuchs 
1992:Ch 2). SSK developed in opposition to philosophical rationalism, foun- 
dationalism, essentialism, and, to a lesser extent, realism. The resources of 
sociology (and contextual history) were, it was said, necessary to understand 
what it was for scientists to behave "logically" or "rationally," how it was that 
scientists came to recognize something as a "fact,"  or as "evidence"  for or 
against some theory, how, indeed, the very idea of scientific knowledge was 
constituted, given the diversity of  the practices claiming to speak for nature 
(Bloor 1984a,b, Collins 1981b). The current philosophical tag corresponding 
to SSK is "social epistemology" (Fuller 1988, 1992). 
Analytic philosophers of science have not much appreciated, nor in many 
cases comprehended, the gesture-a  "social epistemology" seemed to some a 
contradiction in  terms-and  the career of  SSK continues to be  marked by 
trench warfare between its practitioners and the dominant tendencies in the 
philosophy of science (e.g. Brown 1984, 1989, Bloor 1991:163-85). For these 
reasons, SSK developed partly through efforts to exploit some traditional and 
nontraditional sociological resources to show-both  theoretically and empiri- 
cally-how  a sociology of  scientific knowledge was possible, and not as a 
professional extension of  mainstream disciplinary practices into this terrain. 
On the whole, mainstream sociological practitioners did not want sociology 
to go in  such directions or did not believe that it could be so extended. The 
over-publicized "warfare"  between  SSK and the "Mertonians"  was, in fact, 
but a brief early episode in the career of the field and was mainly concerned 
with such questions of possibility (Collins 1983a:266, 271). 
SSK practitioners  soon  found it more  satisfying to  do the sociology of 
scientific knowledge than to argue whether it was possible, and by  the early 298  SHAPIN 
1980s, they were content to point to a body of  detailed empirical studies as 
strong evidence of that possibility (Shapin 1982). Indeed, early practitioners 
systematically argued that scientific knowledge could be understood in just 
the same way as one would go about interpreting any other area of culture- 
there were no special resources or methods required to account for science 
(Barnes 1974). So a number of important writers, having established that point 
of  possibility to their satisfaction, saw no special reason to persist with the 
particular study of the natural sciences and moved on (in whole or in part) to 
applying the methods and resources of SSK to other areas of culture (notably 
technology and economics), to debates in the philosophy of  knowledge and 
theories of representation, to social theory, and, notably, to participation within 
such scientific practices as artificial intelligence (e.g. Barnes 1988, Collins 
1990, Ashmore et a1  1989). 
SSK  and the Forms of Cultural Inquiry 
If intellectual influences on SSK and its diverse disciplinary affiliations make 
the field marginal to the profession of sociology, its preoccupations, circum- 
stances, and several of its findings ought to make it central to the sociological 
enterprise, and, indeed, to cultural inquiry as a whole. On the one hand, SSK, 
like any descriptive or explanatory practice, inevitably deploys our current 
stock of knowledge about what the world, natural and social, is like. However 
much practitioners in this area may mean to show that such items as "neutri- 
nos,"  "neurofibrillary  tangles,"  or "social  class"  are theorized  and socially 
constructed, the realist mode of  speech is ineliminable in  practice, and the 
"phenomenological bracketing" that allows analysts to be curious about how 
such items are constructed is dependent upon a robust realist idiom in speaking 
about other items. Skepticism, as Wittgenstein said, takes place on the margins 
of trusting systems, and radical skepticism is radically disruptive of commu- 
nicative order (Douglas 1986, Shapin 1994:Ch 1). This is no more than to say 
that sociologists of scientific knowledge "know"  the world that science has 
depicted as securely as any other competent members of the culture, and that 
they use this knowledge in producing their accounts. 
On  the  other hand,  the  practice that  seeks to understand  science as an 
historical and social enterprise also demands that analysts be curious about its 
findings, including the findings about the natural and social worlds that have 
to  be  used  to implement that  curiosity. The realist mode  of  speech itself 
becomes an object of curiosity. In this sense, SSK is prone to tension between 
how it speaks and what it says, and its practice is irremediably embedded in 
the objects of its inquiry (Barnes 1981:484, 493). While many philosophical 
and everyday forms of inquiry seek to justify our intuitions about science-its 
correspondence, its  objectivity, its efficacy, and  its progressiveness-SSK 
takes  those  intuitions as matters  to be  interpreted and  explained (Collins SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE  299 
1981b). That makes SSK at times uncomfortable-to  both practitioners and 
readers of their work-but  also fundamental to our culture's self-understand- 
ing. Uneasiness in inquiry is often-not  invariably-a  sign that the inquiry is 
nearing the heart of the matter, and the claimed hyper-awareness of  "post- 
modernity" is played out in SSK in one of its most acute forms. 
The second reason SSK may arguably be central to the sociological enter- 
prise and to cultural inquiry as a whole flows from the categories that tradi- 
tionally comprised the sociology of knowledge and the changes wrought on 
these categories by  work over the past quarter-century. As Merton surveyed 
the field in 1945, the sociology of knowledge was the practice that sought to 
show the influence of social (or "existential")  factors upon "mental produc- 
tions" (Merton 1973; cf Parsons 1949:14). How did social factors condition 
the form, content, and dynamics of cognitive products? There was social stuff 
and there was intellectual stuff, and there were (varying) narratives concerned 
to bridge the Cartesian gulf. That dualism, and that resulting problematic, were 
accepted by all theorists, no matter what scheme they proposed for doing the 
connecting (causal, functional, or symbolic), and no matter what exemptions 
(typically the mental productions of logic, mathematics, and the natural sci- 
ences) they stipulated.I1 
The dualism that provided traditional sociology of knowledge with its frame 
of reference was inherited from ancient lay and philosophical discourse. From 
the Greek philosophical tradition to early Christianity and on into the culture 
of  seventeenth-century English empiricism and nineteenth-century high ro- 
manticism, knowledge was considered to be properly philosophical, sacred, or 
genuine insofar as the circumstances of its attainment were removed from the 
domains of the practical and the political (Shapin 1991a,b). Disengagement 
and disembodiment were ancient tropes of value: Removing knowledge-mak- 
ing from the polis was seen as a technique of transcendence. Accordingly, to 
say that knowledge was produced in and through mundane interactions be- 
tween people, as well as between people and reality, was taken just to say that 
its truth, objectivity, universality, and power were compromised. So far as 
genuine philosophical knowledge was concerned, the polity was a pollutant. 
In  this  way, interpretative and explanatory tasks  were  embedded-largely 
unwittingly-in  traditional tropes of evaluation. Bacon's idols of the theatre 
and the marketplace marked the social contamination of knowledge no less 
"1t  has often been insisted that  Merton himself (1973) was the father of that  "Copernican 
revolution" in the sociology of science which took tnie as well as false belief for its legitimate 
subject, from which it follows, in Bourdieu's opinion (1990:297-98), that writers like Barnes and 
Bloor were merely "crashing through an open door." It is, for all that, remarkable that Merton never 
purported to produce a sociological account of what has been called "the technical content" of 
scientific  knowledge, while  some of his  followers  continue  to  insist  very  vigorously  on  the 
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than the presentation of Greek and early Christian thinkers as withdrawn and 
disengaged. From the late 1930s through the 1960s and beyond, the discourse 
of "internalism"  and "externalism" that so fundamentally structured the prac- 
tice of history and sociology of  science took the dualistic juxtaposition  of 
"social"  versus "rational,"  "intellectual,"  and "evidential" for granted. "The 
social" was taken as that which was "external"  to science, and it was persis- 
tently debated by what means authentic science kept "the social" at bay, how 
and to what extent "social influences" infiltrated science without deleterious 
effects, or how what seemed to be properly scientific knowledge was "in fact" 
socially marked ideology (Shapin 1992). 
Some strands of  early SSK and related social historical work did indeed 
deploy the same society-mind vocabulary as traditional sociology of knowl- 
edge. Here the task was taken to be the showing of  "social influences" on 
properly scientific knowledge where such "influences"  had  previously been 
reckoned not to act. The taken-for-granted equation between the social auton- 
omy and the truth of  knowledge was challenged, and  a series of empirical 
studies sought to establish-without  a tone of  expost-that  even the "hard 
cases"  of  claims within the physical and  mathematical sciences, taxonomic 
sciences, and observation-reports were so "influenced":  Society, and its con- 
cerns, nevertheless "got  in"  (Shapin  1979, MacKenzie  1978, 1981a). To a 
number of critics, that sums up the case that SSK argued: Its bearing upon the 
truth and objectivity of science was taken over from traditional schemes that 
conceived  the  social as a  "contaminant"  (Brown  1989). Where  there  was 
"social  influence," there the roles of  natural reality and rationality were re- 
garded as compromised. 
However, this sensibility in fact grossly misrepresents SSK's case for "the 
social." Rather, the claim was that "the social dimension" of knowledge needed 
to be attended to in order to understand what counts as a fact or a discovery, 
what inferences are made from facts, what is regarded as rational or proper 
conduct, how objectivity is recognized, and how the credibility of  claims is 
assessed. The target here was not at all the legitimacy of scientific knowledge 
but  the  legitimacy  of  individualist  frameworks  for  interpreting  scientific 
knowledge. Attention was drawn to "the social dimension," accordingly, not 
as a pollutant but as a necessary condition for making, holding, extending, and 
changing knowledge. In just  that  sense, the language of  "the  social"  as a 
"dimension," an "influence," or a "factor" to be juxtaposed with the "factors" 
of  evidence and rationality was rendered problematic (Lynch  1991b). And 
here, arguably, SSK was  the primary  field  in  which  that  challenge  to the 
traditional dualism was laid down. 
The challenge was expressed in varying idioms. From 1979 Bruno Latour 
repeatedly pointed out that there was undeniably as much (and arguably more) 
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that the securing of  credibility for scientific claims was a thoroughly social 
and political process. Thus he highlighted as a potential topic of inquiry the 
cultural scheme that simply assumed otherwise (Latour 1987: 30, 62). At the 
same time, the performance of  modern  political action fundamentally  im- 
plicated scientific knowledge of what sorts of things existed in the world and 
how these things acted upon humans. The "missing masses" in existing social 
and political theory were the "nonhumans" predicated by science and technol- 
ogy. A defensible sociology of  science and technology, therefore,  had  the 
potential to recast the terms of social theory generally. Signaling the sensibility 
that sought to remove "the social" from its status as "factor," the second (1986) 
edition of Latour & Woolgar's Laboratory Life deleted the word "social" from 
its original (1979) subtitle: The Social  Construction of  Scientific Facts. To 
remove "the social" from the idea of scientific knowledge was said to remove 
its status as knowledge. 
In a more familiar (anti-)epistemological idiom, Mulkay, Barnes, and Bloor 
sought, from the early 1970s, to establish the inadequacies of individualism 
for interpreting scientific, or any other form of, knowledge. Here the Kuhnian 
framework assumes central significance, not least for appreciating the place 
of SSK vis-a-vis existing sociological traditions. If, for Merton, the answer to 
the HobbesParsons social-order problem was supplied, in the case of science, 
by  a set of allegedly unique social norms making up the "ethos of  science," 
for Kuhn-inspired SSK, the regulative principles of  social order in  science 
were furnished by scientific knowledge itsev Within traditions of  "normal 
science," authoritative socializing institutions schooled practitioners in exem- 
plars ("paradigms")  of what it was to do good science in particular domains. 
For early modern chernists, Robert Boyle's J-tube experiment defined a model 
problem and its model solution, including the embodied representation of what 
it meant for evidence to confirm or disconfirm a theoretical hypothesis; for 
late twentieth-century molecular biologists, the "central dogma"  (by which 
DNA produces RNA produces protein) similarly structures practitioners' sen- 
sibilities about relevant domains of inquiry, about the directionality of molec- 
ular cause, and about the locus of biological meaning. 
From a sociological point of  view, Kuhnian SSK is at once conservative 
and radical. On the one hand, it seeks inter alia to answer traditional questions 
about the grounds of  a communal order, and it does so by  pointing to the 
regulative role of norms. While the regulatory relevance of social maxims ("Be 
skeptical," "Be disinterested) is doubted, the significance of norms for ensur- 
ing  order  and  for  marking  the  boundaries  of  communities  is  vigorously 
respecified and reaffirmed in a new idiom. The solidarity of  specialist com- 
munities--or  such solidarity as is found to exist-is  coordinated through their 
specialist knowledge. Good and bad, proper and improper, interesting and 
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of  the natural world. On the other hand, by arguing that the relevant norms 
are made of  the  same  stuff  as the  community's  technical  knowledge, the 
Kuhnian move overturns the existing  sociology-of-knowledge scheme that 
asks how "society might influence knowledge." 
Just because the sway of  an evaluative individualism in interpreting our 
society's most esteemed knowledge has been so strong, SSK's insistence upon 
a quite elementary feature of the sociological sensibility has seemed to acquire 
a shockingly radical, even subversive, character. If  sociology is the study of 
the collective aspects of human conduct, then a basic role for the sociological 
study of scientific knowledge is showing in what ways that knowledge has to 
be understood as a collective good and its application as a collective process. 
If there is a fundamental and irreducibly sociological point to be made about 
scientific knowledge, it is this one. Society-including  the specialist societies 
of scientists-might  properly be regarded as a distribution of knowledge, just 
as the very idea of knowledge depended upon the social relations of knowers 
(Barnes 1988, Shapin & Schaffer 1985). 
Following such writers as Simmel (1950: 313) and Polanyi (1958), it has 
been  noted that  modern systems of  scientific and technical knowledge are 
highly differentiated and distributed: No one individual keeps the whole of  a 
discipline's knowledge in his or her head, and even the technical knowledge 
involved in the conduct of a single experiment in modern physics or biology 
is typically distributed across a range of specialist actors. In a symbolic inter- 
actionist idiom, actors in different "social worlds" are invariably involved in 
the making of  scientific goods (Star & Griesemer  1989). And,  while this 
distributed character is very evident in modem scientific practice, in principle 
it  is arguably just  as pertinent as a description of  the  "simpler"  scientific 
cultures of past centuries. The director of a large-scale experiment in high-en- 
ergy physics does not have direct knowledge of every aspect of that experi- 
ment, just  as an individual seventeenth-century English natural philosopher 
would typically not have direct evidential warrant for his knowledge of ice- 
bergs, cornets, or the flora of the Americas. As a general matter, practitioners 
rely massively upon others for their knowledge. For there to be solutions to 
the problem of knowledge there have to be practical solutions to problems of 
trust, authority, and moral order (Barnes  1985:49-58,  82-83).  Individualist 
philosophies of knowledge at least since Locke have persistently argued that 
knowledge is genuine and secure when  its warrants are direct, experiential, 
and individual (Shapin 1994:Ch 5). If  that is the case, then the sociological 
sensibility would  suggest that there is perishingly little genuine and secure 
scientific knowledge in the world. Yet that is not what sociologists of scientific 
knowledge have argued: Scientific knowledge is as secure as it is taken to be, 
and it is held massively on trust. The recognition of trustworthy persons is a 
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the bases of that trustworthiness are historically and contextually variable. This 
core sociological insight into the collective nature of knowledge has enormous 
potential to generate detailed comparative studies of the moral economies of 
science, but, perhaps owing to the largely philosophical concerns of  many 
sociologists of scientific knowledge, the point has as yet been made, for the 
most part, at a programmatic level.12 
A fundamental sociological collectivism applies not just to describing the 
conditions in which it can rightly be said that individuals have knowledge but 
also to the means by  which knowledge is acquired, applied, and changed. 
Scientists' knowledge of specialist domains of the natural world, like that of 
children, is for the most part initially acquired via trusted sources. The proper 
applications of  terms like "chicken,"  "dog,"  "electron,"  and "ideal  gas"  are 
not logically fixed; rather, how such terms are used, whether by  scientists or 
laity, is adapted to a range of contingent circumstances, including the weight 
of custom and convention and the purposes people may have in representing 
the world. This is the sense in which it is said, following Durkheim and Mauss, 
that the classification of things reproduces that of people (Bloor 1982). When 
people confront the experience of their senses, they do so within an already 
existing structure of knowledge given them by their community and within a 
structure of purposes sustained by their community. Nor, when new experience 
is confronted, is it logically determined how such experience is to be sorted 
out with respect to existing schemes: whether it is to be counted as evidence 
confirming or disconfirming some theory, whether it is to be bracketed, sub- 
jected  to taboo, or filed away, to be dealt with  another time. It is people's 
goal-orientation-the  pragmatic structure of  the community to which they 
belong-that  judges among possible courses of action. Much of the theoretical 
devel- opment of SSK through the 1970s and early 1980s concentrated upon 
elaborating a fully general sociological framework for interpreting knowledge- 
acquisition and concept-application (Barnes 1982a,b,c, 1983). And, despite the 
fact that this work developed without evident specifiable intellectual "influ- 
ence"  from American pragmatist philosophy, it is wholly compatible  with 
pragmatism, and, by extension, with strands of academic sociology-those  of 
Mead,  Blumer,  and  their  progeny-that  drew  inspiration  from  James  and 
Dewey. 
In this way, SSK opposed philosophical rationalism-the  view that scientific 
judgment is sufficiently determined by  unambiguous criteria of method-by 
asserting the contingency and the locality of judgment.  Rules did not suffi- 
'*~n insistence that SSK shouldbe concretely operationalized  in such ways has informed some 
criticism that it "has not developed a fully-fledged sociological account of science" (Fuchs 1992:Ch 
2, Hagendijk 1994:135). Once more, an accusing finger is pointed at excessively philosophical 
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ciently explain scientific judgment; the way in which rules were identified and 
used was itself a topic for contextual inquiry. Why is it that, since one can 
"rationally" continue the series 2,4,6, 8 .  .  . in any number of ways, the "right 
way" of going on in an arithmetic class is "10" whereas at an American sporting 
event it is more likely to be "who do we appreciate?'(Collins  1992:12-16).13 
Right conduct is tied to place and purpose. The in-principle "interpretative 
flexibility" of rules is securely settled in practice by local notions of decorum. 
By contrast with rationalism, such SSK writers as Barnes and Bloor explic- 
itly endorse a robust realism and, indeed, have noted that the idiom of socio- 
logical realism presupposes a corresponding natural realism: "No consistent 
sociology could ever present knowledge as a fantasy unconnected with our 
experience of  tlie material world around us"  (Bloor 1991:33) or "[Tlhere  is 
indeed one world, one reality, 'out there,' the source of all our perceptions .  .  . 
"(Barnes 1977:25-26, cf 1992, Barnes & Bloor 1982).14  What one cannot.do, 
if one proposes disinterestedly to interpret varying beliefs about nature, is to 
use one particular  account-usually  that of  modem  science-to  gauge the 
validity of others. That would be to include the answer in the premises (Barnes 
1992). All  institutionalized beliefs  about nature  are causally  connected  to 
reality, and all are on a par with respect<o  the manner in which their credibility 
is to be interpreted. Judgments of what is the case, like judgments of what is 
rational, are locally accomplished. 
Situated Knowledge and Its Travels 
Indeed, the best way of summing up the thrust of a great deal of work in SSK, 
and in  related history and philosophy, produced from the mid-1970s to the 
present, is to see it as concerned to show in concrete detail the ways in which 
the making, maintaining, and modification of scientific knowledge is a local 
and a mundane affair. Here the case-study method~ccasionally  belittled as 
piling on more "proof' of "the same sociological theoryw-is  beautifully suited 
to the business at hand, since its "theory"  of  science is more "shown"  than 
"said,  and since its practitioners are rightly skeptical of narratives that purport 
to distill the "essence" of practices as varied as those that are, and have been, 
"The  sociological  locus classicus for treatment of Wittgenstein on rule-following is Winch 
(1958). and in SSK, Collins (1992:Ch 1). Bloor (1983,1992), Lynch (1992a. 1993:Ch 5). 
I4The puzzle of why, despite these insistences, critics of SSK make it out as a recommendation 
of "social variables" versusthe "data from the empirical world (e.g.  Cole 1992:2,12,229)  can best 
be resolved by noting the hold of irzdividualisticempiricismthat makes such dualistic language seem 
natural. Even Collins's famous dictum (1981~34,  cf Collins &Cox 1977:373, Collins 1981b3216, 
1992:16, 174) that "the natural world in no way constrains what is believed to be" is repeatedly 
specified  not  as  an  epistemological or  ontological judgment  but  as  a  "methodological pre- 
scription"-how  analysts should proceed if they are genuinely curious about the bases of varying 
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called "s~ientific."'~  Quite unlike past traditions in the sociology of science, 
SSK case studies are typically tightly focused upon specific passages of sci- 
entific practice. Their detailed ethnographic or historical character is geared 
to breaking down the "enchantment" produced by distance (Collins 1992:  144- 
45)-and  hence the appeal of idealized "method-storiesv-and  to displaying 
the contingency, informality, and situatedness of scientific knowledge-making. 
These "localist"  arguments have proceeded along a number of lines. First, 
science-making is identified as a mundane matter. Exploiting work by  such 
writers as TS Kuhn (1970), Peter McHugh (1970), Jeff Coulter (1975), HWey 
Sacks (1984). and  Melvin Pollner  (1987). much  empirical  and  theoretical 
research has been devoted to showing that the making of scientific knowledge 
can be sufficiently accounted for by ordinary human cognitive capacities and 
ordinary forms of  social interaction (Barnes 1976, Feyerabend 1978, Lynch 
1985, Collins 1992, Shapin 1994). Once the grand narratives of unique scien- 
tific "norms"  and unique scientific "method" lost their compulsion, curiosity 
was unleashed about how scientists used "secular" ways of thinking and acting 
to build up their exceptionally authoritative systems of  knowledge (Barnes 
1974, Lynch 1985,  Latour 1987,1988a, Latour & Woolgar 1986, Turner 1989). 
Almost needless to say, mundane means can produce widely differing prod- 
ucts-just  as stone, mortar, and rules of thumb can produce results as varying 
as a worker's cottage and Durham Cathedral-and  saying that science ought 
to be understood as a typical form of culture is, of course, not the same thing 
as saying that it is no different from other forms of culture. Arguably, sociol- 
ogists and historians are only now in a fit position naturalistically to address 
relevant questions about the character and bases of cultural difference. 
Second, since it is argued that  no scientific claim "shines  with  its own 
light"+arries  its credibility with it-sociologists  and historians have become 
intensely interested in the specific processes of  argumentation and political 
action whereby claims come to be accepted as true or rejected as false. The 
gap between individual experience and public knowledge must always be filled 
by  persuasion, and  the resources available to make claims persuasive can 
include any tools the local culture makes available and is responsive to. The 
"rhetorical turn" in SSK has now yielded a large body of empirical work on 
the techniques of  scientific exposition-the  textual and informal means by 
which scientists labor to persuade others, 'to extend experience from private to 
public domains, to assure others of their disinterestedness, to assert the signif- 
icance of their claims, to argue that their body of knowledge is indeed "sci- 
entific" (Woolgar 1976, 1989, Yearley 1981, Gilbert & Mulkay 1984, Shapin 
'%he  link between the case-study method in science studies and the gtempted revival of the 
casuistical tradition in ethics is worth pursuing. Both instantiate doubt about the regulatory role of 
abstract theories (see e.g. Jonsen & Toulmin 1988, Bauman 1993). 306  SHAPIN 
1984a, Pinch  1985, Latour  1987, Bazerman 1988, Myers  1990, Dear  1991, 
Gieryn 1992). 
Third, stress has been put upon the embodied character of scientific knowl- 
edge. It is noted that scientific competences are not effectively transferred from 
one individual to another, and from one place to another, solely by recipes, 
algorithms, or formal rules of proceeding. Much empirical work has addressed 
the embodied nature of  scientific know-how and the embodied vectors by 
which it travels, whether that  embodiment is reposed in  skilled people, in 
scientific instruments, or in the transactions between people and knowledge- 
making devices. Collins's now-classic study (Collins & Harrison 1975) of the 
transfer of  laser-building skills as embodied tacit knowledge built upon  an 
appreciation of science as craftwork, and that work has in turn been extended 
by ethnomethodological and symbolic interactionist studies of modem biology 
(Lynch 1985, Jordan & Lynch 1992, Clarke & Fujimura 1992, Cambrosio & 
Keating 1988) and mathematics (Livingston 1986), and by historical work on 
physics (Shapin & Schaffer 1985:Ch 6, Moms 1988, Schaffer 1989, 1992a,b, 
Warwick 1992-1993).  astronomy (Schaffer 1988, Van Helden 1994). chem- 
istry (Roberts  1991, Golinski  1994), genetics (Kohler  1994), and medicine 
(Lawrence 1985). 
Finally, empirical and theoretical work has addressed the physical situated- 
ness of scientific knowledge-making (Ophir & Shapin 1991). The grand nar- 
rative of inherent scientific universality deflected attention away from place: 
Situatedness was the mark of lower cultural forms, and science, as Durkheim 
announced (1972:88), was "independent of any local context."  Again, struc- 
tures of evaluation weighed against localist perspectives on science. Yet, from 
the point of view of naturalistic inquiry, science is undeniably made in specific 
sites, and it discernibly carries the marks of those sites of production, whether 
sites be conceived as the personal cognitive space of creativity, the relatively 
private space of  the research laboratory, the physical constraints posed by 
natural or built geography for conditions of  visibility and access, the local 
social spaces of municipality, region, or nation, or the "topical  contextures" 
of practice, equipment, and phenomenal fields (Lynch 1991a, Gooding 1985, 
Shapin 1988). Here SSK has not merely attempted a resuscitation of interest 
in the "contexts of discovery" abandoned by philosophers, it has also opened 
up  new  curiosity  about  structures of  "justification"  and  the  translation  of 
knowledge from place to place. 
It is impossible to treat localist sentiments in the study of science without 
engaging with the contribution of feminist writers, and it is equally impossible 
briefly to summarize one of the modem academy's  most heterogeneous and 
politically charged genres. (Feminist views of science, and their vexed relations 
with SSK and social theory, merit systematic survey on their own by someone 
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ence-that  which  views  the  whole of  post-seventeenth-century  science as 
"essentially masculinist"-is  not, indeed, compatible with post-Kuhnian soci-
ological localism: Grand narratives about what science "essentially is" or about 
its "essential  preoccupations" were just  what the contextual and naturalistic 
turns were meant to reject. To say that science, across a broad sweep of history 
and cultures, was "essentially"  informed by  gender preoccupations, or, with 
the "standpoint" theorists, that women-as-victims are "epistemologically priv-
ileged," represents much the same kind of sensibility as those that announced 
that science was "essentially" about class relations, or about the abstraction 
from common sense, or that a class of free-floating intellectuals existed and 
enjoyed epistemological privilege. Yet other versions of feminist science stud-
ies are perhaps best seen as tributaries of SSK and related streams feeding the 
river of embodied localism. In criticizing individualist, rationalist, and disem-
bodied views of science, such feminists as Dorothy Smith and Lorraine Code 
urge perspectives similar to those of phenomenologically informed SSK, while 
Donna Haraway's flamboyant antimodernism tackles the great Enlightenment 
dualisms-naturelculture,  humanlnonhuman, etc-in  order  to  display  their 
historical specificity and thereby to reject them. Such feminist work often has 
its own intellectual and frankly political agenda, but it is, nevertheless, intel-
ligible to see it as proceeding from sensibilities similar to SSK localism. It is 
another idiom for identifying and interpreting "situated knowledges" (Haraway 
1991: Ch 9).16 
The localist thrust of recent SSK has generated one of the central problems 
for future work. If, as empirical research securely establishes, science is a local 
product, how does it  travel with  what  seems to be  unique efficiency? One 
appeal of the modernist grand narratives of reason, reality, and method was 
the table-thumping  response they  offered  to  questions  about the  travel  of 
science. If, however, universality can no longer be accepted as an assumption 
flowing from the very nature of the knowledge or the "method" for making 
it, then what are the mundane means that so powerfully effect the circulation 
of science? And is that travel, indeed, to be treated as real, or is what circulates 
yet another illusory grand narrative? 
In  this  connection,  SSK has thrown up  one particularly well-developed 
framework for engaging with the problem of  travel. Bruno Latour and his 
associates have offered what  is best  taken  as a descriptive vocabulary  for 
construing  scientific  success and  power  (Callon et  a1  1986, Latour  1987, 
1988a). "Technoscientific"  knowledge-both  propositional  claims  and  the 
I6~n entry to the contestbetween"standpoint,""empiricist,"and "postmodern"feministwriting 
on science can be secured via Bordo (1987). Harding (1986). Code (1991), Haraway (1991). Keller 
(1983, 1986,1988), Longino (1990), Merchant (1980), Noble (1992). Richards & Schuster (1989). 
Schiebinger(l989), and Smith (1990). 308  SHAPIN 
knowledge embodied in technology-are  held stable and treated as true, insofar 
as they are constituted as obligatory passage points for many actors'  work. 
Think, for example, of  the physical knowledge embodied in a thermometer. 
To contest that knowledge would be to fight on many  fronts against many 
institutionalized activities that depend  upon  treating  the thermometer  as a 
"black box." Intercalating science or technology into larger and larger networks 
of action is what makes them durable. When all the elements in a network act 
together to protect an item of knowledge, then that knowledge is strong and 
we come to call it scientific. The central modern scientific phenomenon to 
which attention is directed is thus metrology-the  development of  standards 
and their circulation around the world (Schaffer 1992b, O'Connell 1993, Barry 
1993, Shapin & Schaffer 1985:Ch 6).The suggestion is that the wide distri- 
bution of  scientific knowledge flows from the success of  certain cultures in 
creating and spreading standardized contexts for making and applying that 
knowledge. Phrased in this way, Latour is offering a new, but sociologically 
recognizable, vocabulary for describing institutionali~ation.'~ 
The resources available to effect this intercalation include a range of  dis- 
cursive and technical means. Artfully deployed rhetorical maneuvers delete 
the grammatical modalities that qualify claims: The move from "Bloggs says," 
to "It  is the case," to the submergence of a claim in taken-for-granted back- 
ground assumptions in yet another claim is a way of describing the ascent to 
truth.  Scientific rhetoric  induces readers  to  go in  only  one direction,  that 
pointed out by the author. Theatres of persuasion can be mounted: The dramatic 
staging of such field trials as those laid on by Louis Pasteur at Pouilly-le-Fort 
were  at  once  spectacles of  confidence  and  of  efficacy.  Husbandmen  who 
wanted their livestock protected from anthrax were shown that, to achieve their 
ends, they had to go through Pasteur's Parisian laboratory and that Pasteur had 
to be treated as a transparent spokesman for natural reality. Interests can be 
generated and translated. Potential consumers of  technoscientific goods can 
be told that they really need these goods in order to attain their existing goals, 
or that their goals should be modified so as to achieve even more benefits than 
they had envisaged. Allies have to be enrolled by  such persuasive acts and 
then controlled so that they do not fall out of alignment. Technical means can 
be  found  that  make the  exercise of  power  over  a distance  effective. The 
"immutable mobiles" represented by  print and graphic technologies can cir- 
te ere and elsewhere I knowingly "make a mistakew--common to Anglophone readers4f 
assimilating Latour's work to existing currents of sociological theorizing. This is to set aside the 
radical recasting of the terms of theorizing sought by Latour's "amodemist" metaphysics and its 
bearing on a proper ontological vocabulary for referring to human and nonhuman actors.  Ironically, 
however, this very "misunderstanding" is proving to be the major vehicle for absorbing his work 
outside of  the  French  cultural  context. In  Latourian  vocabulary,  therefore,  "enrollment" is 
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culate with minimum modification and represent a world-to-be-controlled on 
the convenient scale of a tabletop (Latour 1987, 1988a). 
Latour's  inventory of  the means by  which technoscientific knowledge is 
extended amounts to a descriptive vocabulary of power as well as of institu- 
tionalization. Pasteur grows great and powerful, his knowledge is extended 
and made durable, insofar as these effects are achieved. And, while Latour 
repeatedly disavows both psychological theorizing and explanatory intent (Lat- 
our 1988b), the agent deploying these resources is recognizable from Machi- 
avellian and Hobbesian accounts of  human nature: Pasteur is displayed as 
animated by a will to power and domination, and his readers'  decisions to 
acquiesce or submit are treated as those of pragmatic maximizers-of-marginal- 
advantage. The language of militarism and imperialism is natural to this ac- 
count, and its suitability is explicitly asserted. 
Indeed, one way of  situating the Latourian framework within sociological 
traditions would be to see it as unwinding the solution of a social-order problem 
which Parsons proffered. The "dog that doesn't  bark" in Latour's  sociology 
is, indeed, a conception of normative order. All these effects of order and its 
extension are to be achieved by  constant practices of  enrolling, controlling, 
and invigilating. Latourian social order appears all natural fact and no moral 
fact. Therefore, the onus on those who suspect the adequacy of  Hobbesian 
accounts of order would be to produce a post-Mertonian picture of the moral 
economies of science-the  locally distributed conceptions of legitimacy, au- 
thority, and trust by which scientific knowledge comes to be a collective good, 
the  moral-pragmatic preconditions  for  intersubjectivity,  and  the  mundane 
means by  which  moral  orders of  scientific knowledge-making come to be 
distributed around the world. 
Despair and Decorum:  SSK Dissolved? 
No sooner had  the dust settled on  the first claims of  SSK "success"  than a 
number of leading practitioners announced that SSK was a failure and required 
replacement by more "radical" next-things. The grounds of this despair were 
several. The program of "discourse analysis" launched in the early 1980s by 
Michael Mulkay and his students criticized SSK as a form of overenthusiastic 
sociologizing (Gilbert & Mulkay 1984, Mulkay et a1  1983). Rightly observing 
that scientists'  accounting procedures were heterogeneous-sometimes  they 
talked as if work were governed by evidence and method and sometimes as 
if  it  were  shaped by  contingent personal  and  social factors-Mulkay  an-
nounced that sociologists could  never produce "definitive"  descriptions or 
explanations of science, dependent as they were on the jumble of scientists' 
talk. At most and at best, sociologists should document and classify scientists' 
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by  shifting down  a referential level, from  accounts of  what  science  is to 
accounts of scientists' accounts of what it is. 
In  an allied move some of  Mulkay's  students cast a skeptical eye on the 
particular form of  "interest-explanations" produced by  writers in the "Edin- 
burgh School." These too were condemned as instances of sociological over- 
optimism. How could one use "social interests" as explanations of scientists' 
judgments  when  those "interests"  ought properly to be  seen as objects of 
negotiation, constructed in the course of interaction (Woolgar 1981, Yearley 
1982)? Interests were said to be inadequately established on empirical foun- 
dations. They were circularly inferred from the effects they were meant to 
explain, and they were, for these reasons, illegitimately smuggled into socio- 
logical explanations. Here too the "radical next move"  out of  SSK was, by 
another description, the recommendation of judicious retreat from a method- 
ological impasse. 
Discourse analysis and closely related critiques of  SSK have now largely 
been  abandoned.  SSK writers  embraced  the  theoretical  character  of  their 
explanatory notions and wondered what other status "interests"  could have. 
Nor  were  they  content  to  reduce  "interests"  to  "interest-talk."  As  Barnes 
sourly put it, "With cream-cakes there is a chance of satisfying hunger-with 
accounts of cream-cakes there is not"  (Barnes 1981:492-93;  cf MacKenzie 
1981b, Shapin  1984b, Collins & Yearley  1992:303-04).  If  proponents  of 
SSK and many philosophers of science claimed that scientific theorizing can 
never  be  fully justified-uniquely  determined  by  the  evidence-then,  of 
course, the same condition applied to social science theorizing. Nor were the 
foundational claims made for "discourse"  any less vulnerable than explana- 
tory items: The forms of  talk discerned by  discourse analysts went "beyond 
the  evidence"  no  less  than  any  other  sort  of  theoretical  construct.  The 
"radical"  program  of  discourse  analysis  was  identified  as  a  form  of  that 
not-very-radical doctrine, positivism. 
Emerging together with the discourse analytic critique was a "reflexive" 
program. Proponents noted that the discursive forms in which much SSK work 
was embedded shared with science a realist mode of speech in which author- 
ity-claiming authors referred "disinterestedly" to real states of  affairs in the 
social world. This was said to be an unsatisfactory situation, protecting from 
inquiry that which ought properly to be the object of inquiry. Here the proposed 
"radical  next move"  was the purposeful subversion of realist and referential 
modes of speech. "New literary forms" shattering these univocal and referential 
modes were to be put in place of descriptions and explanations of scientific 
conduct, and the objects of  inquiry were to be shifted away from "science" 
and "society"  to the "referring self' which had traditionally reported upon 
"science"  and "society." Such questions were asserted to be deeper and more 
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was no less than that of how we know anything at all (e.g. Ashmore  1989, 
Woolgar 1988b,  Mulkay 1991:xvii). SSK was to be not exploded but imploded. 
To the objection that such practices were getting nowhere, it was robustly 
replied that "getting nowhere should be seen as an accomplishment" and that 
the "somewhere"  purportedly reached by  SSK was  in  fact nowhere  at all 
(Collins & Yearley 1992: 305). 
"Next-step''  radicalism again appeared to those defending SSK as yet an- 
other counsel of despair (Pinch 1993, Pinch & Pinch 1988, Collins & Yearley 
1992:305-9).  "New  literary forms"  arguably have the claimed capacity  to 
break up authority only in the case of quite dim readers. Either no specifiable 
arguments or claims about science are being advanced through these forms (in 
which case no note need be taken of them by those concerned with describing 
or explaining science) or some definite proposition is being advanced (in which 
case readers would attempt to discern it  in the mClange of voices). As with 
discourse analysis, reflexive writers, for all their trying, could not wholly avoid 
the realist mode of  speech, and one could scarcely imagine that their claims 
would be in any way comprehensible if  they had. 
Discourse analysts and reflexivists were partly inspired by  ethnomethod- 
ology, and, indeed, the specifically ethnomethodological critique of  SSK18 
shares their suspicion of  allegedly over-confident sociologizing and their at- 
tempt to shift attention from "why-questions" to "how- question^."'^ Just as 
ethnomethodologists condemn the formalism, the reductionism, and the scien- 
tism of academic sociology, so they consider the social explanations of science 
proffered by  SSK to be impoverished. Like the stylized accounts of  social 
behavior produced by mainstream sociologists, SSK is considered to be insuf- 
ficiently curious about the methods by  which both scientists and those who 
study them produce accounts. Ethnomethodologists also reject asocial philo- 
sophical rationalism as a response to questions about the grounds of  social 
order in science: The production of social order in scientific disciplines is said 
to be, in Lynch's  formulation, "inseparable from the dense texture of under- 
standings and concerted practices that make up disciplinary specific language 
games." The traditional concepts and methodological stances of sociology are 
"simply overwhelmed by the heterogeneity and technical density of the lan- 
guage, equipment,  and  skills through which  [scientists] make  their affairs 
accountable" (Lynch 1993:298-99). 
I81t is notoriously difficult to pin down ethnomethodological doctrine. Here I broadly follow the 
leading ethnomethodological analyst of science, Michael Lynch (1993:Chs 1,4-7). 
19~ere it is unclear whether the position is (i) that "how-questions" are more fundamental and 
should precede  posing  "why-questions"; (ii) that  existing  responses  to  "why-questions" are 
inadequate; or (iii) that "why-questions" are illegitimate in principle and ought to be given up. In 
the event, it remains  uncertain how, in any strong sense, "how-questions"  could be thought  to replace 
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Consequently, ethnomethodology, like strands of SSK, has commended ever 
more finely grained studies of  day-to-day scientific practice. It has been a 
major inspiration to work displaying the mundane and everyday character of 
knowledge-making, while, on a programmatic level, it has expressed doubt 
that sociologists currently possess the conceptual resources to explain or even 
schematically to describe scientific order. To that extent, the ethnomethod- 
ological posture is a form of asceticism. Yet that same unremitting asceticism 
has made ethnomethodologists reluctant to advance some of the more expan- 
sive methodological claims staked out by other critics of SSK. Ethnomethod-
ology, at least in Lynch's form, does not  assert a privileged stance for any 
form of sociological accounting; it does not see foundations or Archimedean 
points available anywhere; and it recognizes no reason to be troubled by or to 
abandon a realist mode of  speech. What makes critics of ethnomethodology 
despair is just the scope of its ascetic modesty. 
Finally, for the past ten years or so, Bruno Latour and his associates have 
publicized their view that sociological explanations of scientific judgment are 
outmoded, fundamentally flawed, and  due for replacement. The traditional 
vocabulary of the sociology of knowledge, which asked how "social factors" 
influenced scientific knowledge, needed to be replaced with studies of how 
nature and  society were  "co-produced."  SSK was  to be  applauded for its 
devastating critique of philosophical rationalism, while its residual ambition 
to explain nature by  reference to society was to be definitively rejected. Just 
as philosophers were wrong to use natural reality to explain scientists' beliefs, 
so sociologists were wrong to use social reality toward that end. Analysts were 
told to be as curious about how society was constructed as they were about 
the construction of natural knowledge. What was wrong with SSK was that it 
was, after all, a form of sociology, using the categories and seeking the goals 
of the sociological realist: "[Tlhe social sciences are part of the problem, not 
of the solution" (Latour 1988b:161). 
The notion of the agent-taken  as the volitional human actor-is  central to 
the sociologist's  vocabulary, and it is in connection with Latour's attempted 
reconceptualization of actors that his work has generated the greatest excite- 
ment, bafflement, and exasperation. Agency, like "interests" and "nature,"  is 
to be regarded as the outcome of  controversies, and we  must not use such 
outcomes to explain the career of controversies. Accordingly, Latour means 
to develop a mode of talking about science and society that does not prejudge 
the location of agency, in particular as between humans and nonhumans: "[Ilt 
is very important ... not to impose any clear distinction between 'things'  and 
'people'  in advance" (Latour 1987:72). In present-day science studies, confu- 
sion reigns about whether what is being offered is a scheme identifying the 
semiotic equivalence of human and nonhuman "actants"-which,  while exotic 
to Anglophone cultural inquiry, does not necessarily impinge upon ordinary SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE  313 
realist speech--or  whether genuine ontological claims are being made, with 
attendant prescriptions for proper speech in science studies and in the wider 
culture. 
It is this aspect of Latour's work that is currently proving most attractive to 
analysts of science with "posthumanist" sensibilities. So Andrew Pickering- 
formerly a leading exponent of  SSK-now  advocates a "drastic overhaul of 
some of our most basic intuitions .  .  . about the world, human and nonhuman"; 
"[olne very distinctive feature of  modem technoscience is ... its capacity to 
unleash upon the world new and nonhuman actors ..." (Pickering 1993a:  104, 
112; also  1993b, Law  1986a,b). Latour's  "actor-networks"  and Haraway's 
"cyborgs"--part  human, part nonhuman-transcend  the "discredited human- 
ist and modernist dualisms and are the appropriate units of analysis for writers 
who wish to talk about making society and making science in the same idiom 
and without commitment to a putatively modernist ontology. Anyone who 
wishes to understand modem science and modem society must supply them- 
selves with a new  way of  talking that reflects the new  realities.20 Like the 
seventeenth-century "moderns,"  some postmoderns evidently still yearn for a 
privileged language whose recommendation over alternatives is that it mirrors 
the order of existence. 
Archimedes'  s Return 
These critiques of  SSK are a heterogeneous lot, and it would be wrong to 
assimilate them too confidently to a common source or sentiment. There are, 
nevertheless, some family resemblances. First, the critiques proceed largely 
through identifying SSK as a form of  sociology. Its sins are said to consist in 
its genetic relationship with the parent that commonly denies the offspring as 
its own. That this irony has largely escaped practitioners presumably stems 
from the circumstance that so few of them have substantial commitments to 
the parental discipline. Almost needless to say, there is no reason automatically 
to deprecate that  circumstance or these criticisms. Neither commitment to 
fundamerital sociological resources nor the capacity to contribute to sociolog- 
ical inquiry necessarily depends upon the forms of professional membership. 
Nor is it a prudent course for an academic discipline to ignore or seek to ban 
fundamental criticism. Indeed, the baroque reflectiveness of the science studies 
community throws into relief  major features of  the  sociological enterprise 
which more complacent and peaceable specialities are less commonly obliged 
to confront. 
Second, these critiques of  SSK, and, by  extension, of  sociology, have a 
2qt is not at  all  clear  whether  such  claims  are  indeed  specifically  tied  to  nineteenth-  or 
twentieth-century realities, or whether they are meant to have wider temporal scope. 314  SHAPIN 
skeptical character. Typically, they are skeptical about the claimed capacity 
of sociological categories to explain or reliably describe the scientific objects 
of inquiry. Skepticism has an ancient pedigree; it corrodes complacency and 
convention, and for that reason alone the skeptic who makes life so awkward 
for the securely institutionalized practitioner should be cherished like the most 
maddening of  mad uncles in a well-knit family. As Collins (1992:6)  puts it, 
skepticism has the virtue of  being a "safe,  legal and inexpensive [way] to 
loosen the trammels of commonsense perception." In this case, the skeptic's 
voice has challenged the legitimacy with which sociological descriptive, inter- 
pretative, and explanatory categories have been applied, and they have chal- 
lenged the validity of the categories themselves. Versions of this skepticism 
target not only the categories of academic sociology but, importantly, those of 
realist modes of  speech entrenched in our own ~ulture.~'  SSK itself is, after 
all, a form of skepticism-for  example, with respect to the traditional vocab- 
ulary of "social versus cognitive factors." The effect of this skepticism-both 
that of  SSK and of  its critics-has  been, in  my  view, overwhelmingly con- 
structive. If, indeed, there was any taken-for-grantedness about what it was to 
give a sociological description, interpretation, or explanation of science, it has 
now been buried under an avalanche of  methodological self-consciousness. 
Third, and arguably in tension with the skeptical posture, these critiques- 
with versions of  ethnomethodology probably excepted-have  also typically 
betrayed a millenarian optimism. Existing sociology is said to be insecurely 
founded. Yet  if  only we  could get our concepts or discourse right, if  only 
we could take one more reflexive turn, if only we could go down one more 
analytic level, if  only the right, theoretically neutral metalanguage could be 
devised, then at last we  would reach intellectual terra firma and all would 
be  well.  However,  far  from  being  a  "radical  next  move,"  there  are  no 
intellectual aspirations more traditional than the quest for foundations: a pure 
and uncompromised place beneath, above, beyond, or apart from the com- 
promised categories of  the culture to which intellectuals mundanely belong. 
In  other moods, critics of  SSK have themselves made major contributions 
to discrediting foundationalism. Yet in their struggle to escape the constraints 
of  sociology,  they  have  fallen  into  the  oldest  temptation  ever  to  afflict 
intellectuals. If  the move  from traditional sociology of  knowledge to SSK 
was the abandonment of  pretensions to privilege and of  "the  Archimedean 
point,"  then the unwitting thrust of  these critics of  SSK is that such a point 
can, after all, be found. 
2'~nd here the break between interpretative sociological goals and strands  of postmodem science 
studies and Latourian practice is most apparent, since, to my knowledge, no past or present-day 
scientific community trades in "stronger or weaker heterogeneous networks of actants" while all 
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If  there is an authentic sociological voice to be set against individualism, 
empiricism, and positivism, then that voice says "It  cannot be  donew-not 
in science and not in the study of science. The "cage"  from which the critics 
evidently seek escape is not just  sociology, but the realist mode of  speech 
which sociology shares with everyday talk. That robust realism is said to be 
the problem to which there must be a remedy. To be sure, the categories of 
mainstream sociology are not immune from important criticism just because 
they  are a version of  the realist mode of  speech, but neither can criticism 
intelligibly suppose that the realist mode can be replaced. The "cage"  from 
which "escape"  is sought is, in fact, a condition of such liberty as we enjoy. 
Intellectuals are not obliged to leap free from their culture in order to subject 
their culture to questioning, nor must the great, and allegedly "modernist" 
or "humanist"  dualisms be replaced in order to be skeptical of them. Notice, 
for  example,  that  Latour's  idea  of  "heterogeneous  networks"  is  wholly 
intelligible, and that the condition of its intelligibility is reference to entities 
plucked  from the  culture's  existing  realist  repertoires: human,  nonhuman, 
science, society. And  if  "modernist"  dualisms were a "trap,"  then  it would 
follow that late twentieth-century culture could contain no such thing as a 
"materialist theory of the mind." The fact that there is such a theory indicates 
that we  are not, evidently, ensnared by the categories of realist language at 
all. 
There are, however, limits to skepticism about the categories of the common 
culture, and those limits are posed by the boundaries of communication. We 
can develop and put in  place arcane languages, but we  cannot ensure that 
others  will  hear  us.  Communicative  orders  are  grounded  in  local  natural 
attitudes and local realist idioms.22  If we wish effectively to speak to a specified 
community, we  are obliged  to  share its  realist idiom.  And  if  we  want  to 
communicate at all then we are obliged to employ some version of the realist 
mode of speech. That obligation is, properly speaking, a constraint. It means, 
in the present case, that intelle~tuals'  intelligible communication about modem 
scientific culture will always be compromised by the cultural categories shared 
between ourselves, the laity, and the scientists we talk about. And if that speech 
is not so compromised, then it will not be intelligible. Discontent with that 
formulation would, indeed, be a measure of the extent to which sociology has 
been rejected or ignored. 
22~ee Collins's argument (versus Latour) in  favor of "sociological  realism" as sociological 
decorum (Collins & Yearley 1992).No one realist mode is privileged, but we  can and should, Collins 
says, seek to "alternate" between realisms. We suspend irony about our local realist presumptions 
as a "methodological convenience." I thank Michael Lynch and Charis Cussins for enlightening conversation and 
David Bloor and Steven Epstein for critical comments on a previous draft of 
this piece. 
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